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TAKING STRICKLAND CLAIMS SERIOUSLY
STEPHEN F. SMITH*
Every criminal defendant is promised the right to the effective assistance of counsel. Whether at
trial or on first appeal of right, due process is violated when attorney negligence undermines the
fairness and reliability of judicial proceedings. That, at least, is the black-letter law articulated in
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

In practice, however, the right to effective

representation has meant surprisingly little over the last two decades. Under the standards that
emerged from Strickland, scores of defendants have received prison or death sentences by virtue of
serious unprofessional errors committed by their attorneys.
This Essay canvasses a line of recent Supreme Court cases that have breathed new life into
Strickland as a meaningful guarantee of effective defense representation. These cases—all of which
involved sentences of death—pointedly reject the understanding of Strickland that made it
exceedingly difficult to prevail on ineffective-assistance claims. Although the new line of Strickland
cases were undoubtedly motivated by concerns about the proper administration of the death penalty,
the more rigorous understanding of Strickland should not be limited to capital cases. Whether or not
the death penalty is at stake, appellate courts should be vigilant in policing the effectiveness of
defense attorneys so that the determinative factor in criminal proceedings will be the strength of the
government’s case on the merits, not the weakness of the defense put forth by the lawyers for the
defendants.

I. INTRODUCTION
Important as it is in our adversarial system of justice, the right of criminal
defendants to be represented by counsel rests on a contradiction. On the one
hand, the right to counsel is deemed an essential component of due process—
essential because a judicial system that denies suspects access to counsel for
their defense is likely to produce inaccurate and unreliable outcomes. 1
Without lawyers, defendants, innocent and guilty alike, typically will have
little hope of presenting credible defenses or successfully asserting their legal

* Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame.
1. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342–44 (1963) (incorporating the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel against the states). In Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 356 (1963),
the Supreme Court ruled that suspects also have the right to counsel in their first appeals of right (as
distinct from discretionary and postconviction review proceedings). Douglas rested on due process
as well as equal protection concerns. See id. at 356–58. The due process roots of the right to counsel
can be traced back to at least Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932), in which the Court ruled
that, even apart from the Sixth Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment‘s Due Process Clause itself
requires the appointment of counsel in certain situations.
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rights.2 Mere access to counsel, however, is not enough to avert the danger of
inaccurate, unreliable results.
The attorneys who represent criminal
defendants must actually discharge their responsibilities effectively—that is,
with professional competence and diligence—in order for the criminal justice
system to work properly. 3 So viewed, criminal defense attorneys are not the
crafty individuals of the public imagination who subvert justice by getting the
guilty off on technicalities. Instead, they are a salutary part of a criminal
justice system in which the search for truth, and the rule of law, critically
depends on the vigorous adversarial testing of criminal charges.
On the other hand, constitutional ineffectiveness doctrine treats the right
to counsel as itself a technicality rather than a procedural safeguard to be
taken seriously. The lower federal courts originally refused to grant relief for
defense attorney blunders unless the attorney‘s poor performance rendered the
entire proceeding a ―mockery of justice.‖ 4 Even after endorsing the standard
of ―reasonable competence‖ in Strickland v. Washington,5 the Supreme Court
framed the standard in such unforgiving terms, and applied it so strictly, that
the new standard did little to actualize—and, indeed, undermined—the ideal
of effective representation. For many years under Strickland, the Court
repeatedly tolerated minimal effort and preparation by defense attorneys,

2. The classic statement of this point comes from Powell v. Alabama:
Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill
in the science of law. . . . Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial
without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence
irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and
knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect
one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings
against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of
conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence. If that be
true of men of intelligence, how much more true is it of the ignorant and
illiterate, or those of feeble intellect.
Id. at 69.
3. Recognizing the vital linkage between access to counsel and attorney competence, the Court
in Powell suggested that the relevant right is the right to the effective representation of counsel, not
simply the right to counsel. See id. at 71 (holding that, to comport with due process, appointed
counsel must give ―effective aid in the preparation and trial of the case‖); see also, e.g., McMann v.
Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970) (stating that ―the right to counsel is the right to the
effective assistance of counsel‖). Half a century after Powell, the Supreme Court extended the right
to effective assistance to the appellate context. See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 397 (1985)
(holding that in cases where the right to appellate counsel applies under Douglas v. California,
attorneys must discharge their duties effectively).
4. See, e.g., United States v. Long, 419 F.2d 91, 94 (5th Cir. 1969) (describing the ―well
established‖ rule that criminal defendants are not entitled to relief for attorney errors unless those
errors are ―of such a nature as to render the trial a farce and a mockery of justice which shocks the
conscience of the court‖).
5. 466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984).
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refused to hold defense attorneys to the minimum standards of conduct
prescribed by the legal profession, and blindly deferred to strategic and
tactical decisions by counsel. In stark contrast to the access-to-counsel cases,
then, the ineffectiveness cases signaled that the right to counsel is not terribly
important after all: in the vast majority of cases, all that really matters is that
the defendant was represented by a licensed attorney.
Interestingly, the Supreme Court‘s recent ineffectiveness decisions have
finally begun to take the right to counsel as seriously as the access-to-counsel
cases would require. In a line of recent cases, the Court has granted relief to
several defendants whose death sentences likely resulted from attorney error.
These cases, which have not yet gotten the attention they deserve, 6 mark a
dramatic shift from prior practice before and after Strickland. Now, the Court
no longer ignores professional standards of conduct in deciding what
constitutes constitutionally ―effective‖ representation or tolerates minimal
effort by counsel. Defense attorneys must, on pains of being faulted for
ineffective assistance, diligently investigate and defend their clients‘ cases—
in capital cases, at least.
This Essay explores the recent shift in ineffectiveness doctrine. Part II
discusses the traditional, hands-off approach to regulating the effectiveness of
defense attorneys. As the discussion indicates, that approach is one that
essentially replaces the right to effective representation with the considerably
more modest right to be represented by counsel—and, in doing so,
compromises the accuracy and reliability imperatives that undergird the
constitutional ideal of effective representation.
Part III canvasses recent cases that have begun to take the guarantee of
effective representation of counsel seriously. At a minimum, these cases
suggest that the Court has adopted a heightened standard of attorney
performance in capital cases, where the defendant‘s life hangs in the balance.
The Court finally appears to have recognized that its ongoing efforts under the
Eighth Amendment to rationalize the imposition of the death penalty will be
futile without renewed emphasis on the quality of representation that
defendants receive in capital cases. Part IV contends that the more stringent
standard of attorney effectiveness, though undoubtedly motivated by concerns
over the administration of the death penalty, should not be limited to capital
cases. In this respect, ―death‖ is not ―different‖: If the legal system truly does
value the goals of accuracy and reliability, the right to counsel should be taken

6. The most extensive treatments to date are John H. Blume & Stacey D. Neumann, “It’s Like
Deja Vu All Over Again”: Williams v. Taylor, Wiggins v. Smith, Rompilla v. Beard and a (Partial)
Return to the Guidelines Approach to the Effective Assistance of Counsel, 34 AM. J. CRIM. L. 127
(2007), and Stephen F. Smith, The Supreme Court and the Politics of Death, 94 VA. L. REV. 283
(2008).
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seriously in all criminal proceedings, not just capital cases.
II. STRICKLAND V. WASHINGTON AND INEFFECTIVE-ASSISTANCE CLAIMS
A. The Strickland Standards (Plural)
The governing standard for constitutional claims of ineffective assistance
of counsel comes from Strickland v. Washington.7 In that case, the Supreme
Court held that defendants cannot prevail on ineffectiveness claims unless
they prove both defective performance by their attorneys and legally
cognizable prejudicial effect on the relevant outcome. Attorney performance
is not defective unless, based on what the attorney knew or should have
known at the time, his actions were ―outside the wide range of professionally
competent assistance.‖8 No matter how poor the attorney‘s performance was,
prejudice—defined as a ―reasonable probability that, but for counsel‘s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different‖—is required in order for a defendant to win relief. 9
Although courts and commentators frequently refer to ―the Strickland
standard‖ in the singular, the reference is really something of a misnomer.
The phrase is used as shorthand for the two-pronged, performance-andprejudice test that Strickland announced. Unfortunately, the economy of
words that the shorthand produces may come at the expense of a proper
understanding of the law that Strickland announced. In addition to being
descriptively false, 10 references to the performance-and-prejudice test as ―the
Strickland standard‖ suggest that it is the performance and prejudice
requirements that determine the vitality of ineffectiveness doctrine in
promoting the ideal of effective representation in criminal cases. This
suggestion, however, is mistaken.
The basic approach in Strickland—to restrict relief to cases where it is

7. 466 U.S. 668, 690–92 (1984).
8. Id. at 690.
9. Id. at 694. Several violations of the representational ideal are so inherently prejudicial that
they are reversible even if Strickland prejudice cannot be shown. Among these are denials of
counsel, actual or constructive, and simultaneous representation of clients with conflicting interests.
See id. at 692.
10. Properly understood, Strickland contains not one standard, but several. The first is a
constitutional standard of performance for criminal defense attorneys (an ―objective‖ standard of
―reasonable competence‖). Id. at 688, 696, 714. The second is a standard of prejudice telling courts
when they may and may not grant relief for defective performance (reasonable likelihood that the
outcome would have been more favorable to the defendant with effective representation). Id. at 696.
The third encompasses a variety of meta-rules instructing courts how they should go about deciding
whether or not defendants have met Strickland‘s performance and prejudice standards. Id. at 696–97.
For example, courts must evaluate performance without hindsight and cannot find prejudice based on
lost opportunities for jury nullification. See id. at 689, 695.
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reasonably likely that serious attorney error had a detrimental effect on the
outcome—is not only sensible but entirely consistent with the ideal of
effective representation. Error-free trials are impossible (or virtually so), and
accurate and reliable outcomes can be reached in spite of attorney or other
error.11 In addition, retrials are quite costly, both in terms of judicial resources
and the strong interest in preserving the finality of criminal convictions.
These costs should not be lightly incurred.
Moreover, the constitutional ideal of effective representation does not
seek to improve the quality of representation bar members provide. That
laudable goal, after all, is the proper concern of law schools, state bar
authorities, and legal professional organizations such as the American Bar
Association (ABA). The Constitution is concerned about the level of
competence of defense attorneys only to the extent attorney performance
threatens the ability of the judicial system to reach accurate and reliable
results in criminal cases.12 Therefore, it makes perfect sense to condition
relief for an ineffectiveness claim on proof that the unprofessional errors of
the defense attorney likely had an adverse effect on the outcome.
Of course, there is much more to Strickland than simply the performanceand-prejudice test. There are also meta-rules instructing lower courts about
how to apply each prong of the test. It is here that the true threat to the ideal
of effective representation lies.
11. This is why, for example, most constitutional criminal procedure claims are subject to
harmless-error analysis, on both direct and collateral review, and precious few such claims (often
collected under the heading of ―structural error‖) are reversible per se, regardless of effect on the
proceeding. See generally Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306–07 (1991) (distinguishing ―trial
errors‖ that are subject to harmless-error analysis from ―structural errors‖). Of course, because a
showing of prejudice is necessary to establish a Strickland violation, ineffectiveness claims are not
subject to harmless-error analysis. The two-pronged Strickland test necessarily assumes that
defendants are entitled to relief if it is reasonably probable that the outcome would have been more
favorable to them had they been assisted by competent counsel. Not only is there no hint anywhere
in Strickland that violations of the right to the effective assistance of counsel can be disregarded as
harmless error, but Strickland specifically states that a successful ineffectiveness claim ―requires
showing that counsel‘s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose
result is reliable.‖ 466 U.S. at 687. This is the language of a ―structural defect,‖ within the meaning
of Fulminante, that defies harmless-error analysis.
12. As the Strickland majority noted:
In giving meaning to the requirement [of effective assistance of counsel] . . . ,
we must take its purpose—to ensure a fair trial—as the guide. The benchmark
for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel‘s conduct so
undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial
cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.
Id. at 686. But see id. at 711 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (―Every defendant is entitled to a trial in
which his interests are vigorously and conscientiously advocated by an able lawyer. A proceeding in
which the defendant does not receive meaningful assistance in meeting the forces of the State does
not, in my opinion, constitute due process.‖).
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The meta-rules ensured that defense attorney actions would receive, at
most, only minimal judicial scrutiny. Courts were basically left without
standards to apply in deciding whether the attorney had provided
professionally competent representation. Courts could not generate fixed
constitutional rules about what attorneys should and should not do in
particular circumstances. Such rules would be inappropriate, in the Strickland
majority‘s view, because criminal defense is ―art,‖ not science, and there are a
wide variety of different approaches that defense attorneys might responsibly
take on any set of facts.13 Naturally, the bar and legal professional groups
generate standards to guide bar members, but Strickland dismissed legal
professional standards as ―only guides‖ to determining what constitutes
effective representation, the implication being that attorney actions that
violate governing professional norms can nonetheless be constitutionally
adequate.14
In addition to being left without standards by which to decide whether
attorney performance is objectively reasonable, courts were pointedly
instructed to err on the side of rejecting Strickland claims. In this area, said
the Court, judicial scrutiny ―must be highly deferential,‖ particularly when
matters of strategy and tactics are at stake. 15 Accordingly, courts ―must
indulge a strong presumption that counsel‘s conduct falls within the wide
range of reasonable professional assistance.‖ 16 To do otherwise and allow
―[i]ntensive scrutiny of counsel,‖ the Court feared, would ―dampen the ardor
and . . . independence of defense counsel‖ and ―discourage the acceptance of
assigned cases.‖17 In combination, these meta-rules signaled that Strickland
13. Id. at 681 (majority opinion); see also id. at 688 (rejecting the idea of ―a checklist for
judicial evaluation of attorney performance‖).
14. Id. at 688; see also id. at 693 (noting that ―an act or omission that is unprofessional in one
case may be sound or even brilliant in another‖).
15. Id. at 689.
16. Id.; see also id. at 690 (―[C]ounsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate
assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.‖).
The Court added that, in reviewing the reasonableness of defense attorney actions, judges must
―eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight‖ by evaluating those actions ―from counsel‘s
perspective at the time.‖ Id. at 689.
17. Id. Although the meta-rules described in the text concerned the performance prong,
Strickland also described a rule concerning the application of the prejudice prong:
In making the determination whether the specified errors resulted in the
required prejudice, a court should presume, absent challenge to the judgment on
grounds of evidentiary insufficiency, that the judge or jury acted according to
law. An assessment of the likelihood of a result more favorable to the
defendant must exclude the possibility of arbitrariness, whimsy, caprice,
―nullification,‖ and the like. . . . The assessment of prejudice . . . should not
depend on the idiosyncracies of the particular decisionmaker, such as unusual
propensities toward harshness or leniency.
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claims are to be denied if there is any conceivable basis for rationalizing the
attorney‘s actions.
B. The Strickland Standards, As Applied
To see the impact of the meta-rules announced in Strickland, consider the
facts of that case. During a bizarre, ten-day crime spree, the defendant had
committed multiple murders and related serious crimes. He turned out not
only to be a public menace, but his own worst enemy in court. Against his
court-appointed attorney‘s advice, the defendant pled guilty to all charges and
waived his right to an advisory sentencing jury, opting instead to be sentenced
by the trial judge.
Understandably beset with a ―sense of hopelessness about the case,‖ 18 the
attorney all but gave up on his client. Even though the defendant had told the
court that his crimes were committed under extreme mental or emotional
distress, his attorney did not request a psychiatric evaluation, which might
have been used to avoid a death sentence. Instead of thoroughly investigating
his client‘s background in search for potential character witnesses or other
mitigating evidence, the attorney merely had a conversation with the
defendant and two family members. Ultimately, the attorney threw his client
on the mercy of the court, citing the defendant‘s admission of guilt and claim
of emotional distress. The judge, not surprisingly, was unimpressed and
imposed three death sentences.
The majority‘s resolution of the case before it powerfully underscored the
message that Strickland claims are not to be taken seriously. Given that the
aggravating factors were ―utterly overwhelming‖ 19 and no significant
mitigation evidence was ever found, the majority could simply have rejected
the ineffectiveness claim for lack of prejudice. The majority, however, also
went to great lengths to demonstrate that the lackluster effort of the defense
attorney did not constitute defective performance. Where the dissent saw an
attorney giving up on his client as a lost cause, 20 the majority saw a ―strategic
choice‖ to ignore potential grounds for mitigation based on psychological and
character evidence and to focus almost entirely on his client‘s acceptance of
responsibility. 21 To the majority, although this choice was not the product of
Id. at 694–95. A later line of cases addresses the kinds of outcome effects that do, and do not, count
as Strickland prejudice. Compare, e.g., Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198 (2001) (incremental
jail time resulting from attorney error counts) with Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986) (loss of
opportunity to present a perjured defense does not count).
18. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 672. For the facts on which the following summary is based, see id.
at 671–75.
19. Id. at 699.
20. See id. at 717–19 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
21. Id. at 699 (majority opinion).
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diligent investigation into the available alternatives, it was reasonable because
psychological and character evidence would have been ―of little help‖ if
introduced and might have harmed the defendant‘s cause by prompting
rebuttal from the prosecution. 22
Here is where the Court seriously undermined the ideal of effective
representation. The Court‘s application of the performance prong gave
attorneys license to make precipitous judgments ruling out certain lines of
defense very early in the case based on what amounts to speculation, as well
as the ability to insulate those judgments against judicial scrutiny by uttering
the magic words of ―strategy‖ and ―tactics.‖ Common sense suggests that
lawyers cannot reasonably decide to pursue certain lines of defense to the
exclusion of others unless they have first investigated the pertinent options.
Only then will they be in a position to exercise professional judgment, and to
make reasonable strategic or tactical choices, about whether to pursue all lines
of defense or, if a choice is necessary, about which should and should not be
pursued.
The attorney in Strickland did not know—and could not possibly have
known—what the potential psychological and character evidence was, much
less how strong or weak it was. After all, he did not ask for a psychological
examination and did nothing to seek character evidence other than speak with
the defendant‘s wife and mother. For all the lawyer knew, there might have
been ―smoking gun‖ evidence supporting the defense‘s claim of severe
emotional distress and compelling character evidence showing that, apart
from this crime spree, he was a nonviolent person. 23
Although the attorney could properly doubt how significant a character
defense would be for someone accused of a spate of brutal murders, that most
certainly was not the case for the psychological evidence. The attorney
actually argued emotional distress, a statutory mitigating circumstance, at the
penalty hearing as a ground for leniency. Having recognized the importance
of that mitigating circumstance to the defendant‘s admittedly slim chances of
avoiding a death sentence, any reasonable attorney would have known that,
without testimony from a mental health professional or other evidence
supporting the claim of severe emotional distress, the claim was sure to fail.
Needless to say, presenting psychological evidence would have opened
22. Id.
23. As it turned out, strong psychological or character evidence in favor of the defendant was
never found, even on postconviction review, but the lawyer had no way to know at the time whether
or not such evidence existed. This is significant because, under Strickland, attorney performance is
judged ―from counsel‘s perspective at the time.‖ Id. at 689. In any case, the failure of
postconviction counsel to find helpful mitigation evidence does not necessarily mean that no such
evidence could have been found with reasonable diligence. It may simply mean that postconviction
counsel was ineffective in his effort to prove the ineffectiveness of trial counsel.
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the door to rebuttal, but that risk was clearly worth taking in the
circumstances. In the face of the overwhelming aggravating factors, it was
very unlikely, if not impossible, that the judge would credit an emotionaldistress argument unsupported by evidence or rule out execution for a triple
homicide simply because the defendant had admitted guilt. Facing such long
odds, a reasonable attorney would have thrown caution to the winds and
aggressively sought evidence supporting the emotional-distress claim, secure
in the knowledge that, if the evidence turned out to be weak, the attorney
could still make the mitigation argument without offering supporting
evidence. If, as Strickland suggests, fear of possible rebuttal is an excuse, not
just for not introducing evidence on a point, but also for not investigating
what the evidence might be, then even the most inept or inattentive lawyer
will have an ironclad response whenever challenged for ineffective assistance.
Of course, guilt was admitted and beyond doubt in Strickland, and so the
defense attorney‘s decisions could not have undermined the reliability of the
guilt determination. Nevertheless, those decisions were reasonably likely to
have undermined the accuracy and reliability of the determination of the
proper sentence. Even in noncapital cases, attorney errors that result in a
more severe sentence are proper concerns of the ineffectiveness doctrine, no
matter how small the incremental sentence. 24 Under Eighth Amendment
doctrine, concerns about accuracy and reliability in sentencing are of
heightened concern in capital cases. The goal is to ensure that the death
penalty is reserved, in law and in fact, for the ―worst‖ offenders and applied
fairly, reliably, and evenhandedly. 25
The lax performance standards adopted in Strickland pose a serious threat
to the Eighth Amendment‘s goal of rationalizing the imposition of the death
penalty. In order for capital juries to determine whether or not a defendant
deserves death, defense attorneys must seek to humanize their client and
develop and present grounds for showing mercy despite the seriousness of his
crime. If prosecutors vigorously present the case for death—and elected
prosecutors have every reason to do so to avoid potentially stigmatizing
defeats—a lackluster defense effort will tend to skew the life/death balance in
favor of death. 26 In that event, as Justice Thurgood Marshall argued in
24. See, e.g., Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198, 200 (2001) (ruling that incremental jail
time resulting from attorney error constitutes Strickland prejudice).
25. See generally Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on
Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 361–403
(1995).
26. As I have explained elsewhere:
Ordinarily, vigorous prosecution is an unmitigated good because it helps ensure
that the truth-seeking function of criminal trials will be fulfilled. In the context
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Strickland, the capital sentencing decision may well turn on lapses of
lawyering, as opposed to constitutional and statutory standards concerning
when death is, and is not, the appropriate sanction. 27
The problem is deeper than simply performance standards that are too lax.
Even in cases where defective performance can be shown, the meta-rules
concerning prejudice make it difficult to overturn a death sentence on
ineffectiveness grounds. Under Strickland, ―the possibility of arbitrariness,
whimsy, caprice, ‗nullification,‘ and the like‖ by the decision maker does not
constitute prejudice. 28 This makes it difficult to reverse where, as in
Strickland itself, the aggravating factors are strong. In those situations, it
would seem, only a lawless sentencer could have rejected a sentence of death.
This rule that lost opportunities for ―lawless‖ decision making cannot
constitute Strickland prejudice makes sense at the guilt stage (where
nullification is forbidden) and in determinate sentencing schemes (such as the
then-mandatory Federal Sentencing Guidelines) that impose legally binding
limits on sentencing discretion. After all, in those contexts, the relevant
decision makers are bound to follow the legal standards that govern their
decisions. The Strickland rule makes no sense at all, however, for the
of capital sentencing hearings characterized by severe resource constraints on
defense counsel, however, the effect is not nearly so salubrious. Many
resource-constrained defense attorneys (particularly those who lack extensive
experience in capital litigation) focus their efforts on the guilt phase at the
expense of the penalty phase. With astonishing frequency, the result is weak or
nonexistent mitigation cases. For example, in the trials of forty of the 131
prisoners Texas executed from January of 1995 to June of 2000, defense
lawyers presented ―no evidence whatsoever or only one witness during the
trial‘s sentencing phase.‖ Given how unlikely resource-constrained capital
defenders are to present serious cases in mitigation, the more effort and
resources the prosecution invests at the sentencing stage, the less likely it will
be that the jury‘s eventual life/death decision will accurately reflect whether or
not the defendant truly deserves to die.
Smith, supra note 6, at 316–17 (footnotes and emphasis omitted).
27. Justice Marshall argued:
The performance of defense counsel is a crucial component of the system
of protections designed to ensure that capital punishment is administered with
some degree of rationality. ―Reliability‖ in the imposition of the death sentence
can be approximated only if the sentencer is fully informed of ―all possible
relevant information about the individual defendant whose fate it must
determine.‖ The job of amassing that information and presenting it in an
organized and persuasive manner to the sentencer is entrusted principally to the
defendant‘s lawyer. The importance to the process of counsel‘s efforts,
combined with the severity and irrevocability of the sanction at stake, require
that the standards for determining what constitutes ―effective assistance‖ be
applied especially stringently in capital sentencing proceedings.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 715–16 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (internal citation and footnotes omitted).
28. Id. at 694–95, 699–700.
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life/death decision that capital sentencers make at the penalty phase.
Under Eighth Amendment case law, the fact finder is far more than simply
a balancer of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Its most important
function, perhaps, is to serve as a dispenser of mercy—in the case of juries, to
bring the mores of the community to bear on whether to spare the life of a
defendant whom the law deems ―death-eligible.‖ Indeed, the Supreme Court
has repeatedly ruled that a valid death penalty scheme must afford capital
sentencers not only discretion, but unfettered discretion to impose a sentence
other than death.29 As even their most trenchant critic recognizes, these rulings
mandate that ―the sentencer must enjoy unconstrained discretion to decide
whether any sympathetic factors bearing on the defendant or the crime indicate
that he does not ‗deserve to be sentenced to death.‘‖30 This description implies
that, in ―death‖ cases, defendants are entitled to seek leniency based on what
Strickland derided as ―lawless‖ grounds, even when the law defining deatheligibility and the balance of aggravating and mitigating factors would permit a
reasonable jury to impose a sentence of death.
To be consistent with the jury‘s recognized role as a dispenser of mercy in
capital cases, the definition of Strickland prejudice should allow for the
possibility that sentencers might choose to exercise their constitutional
prerogative to grant mercy to defendants who otherwise could lawfully be
sentenced to death. The contrary definition of prejudice in Strickland fails to
do so. By assuming that a reasonable likelihood of a different result cannot be
shown when the aggravating factors are strong, the definition of prejudice
treats capital juries as simple fact finders who balance aggravating and
mitigating factors instead of making the distinctly moral judgment of whether
the defendant should receive mercy despite the severity of his crime.
Strickland‘s narrow conception of the role of capital juries not only disserves
the Eighth Amendment goal of allowing unrestricted opportunities for mercy
in capital sentencing; it also creates perverse incentives for attorneys
defending individuals convicted of capital crimes to ignore a core purpose of
capital sentencing hearings—namely, to determine whether the defendant is
morally (as well as legally) deserving of a death sentence. In cases where the
aggravation evidence is strong, Strickland makes it all too easy for defense
attorneys to defend tactical choices to focus on the guilt phase to the exclusion
of the penalty phase, or to ignore a mitigation defense in favor of other
defenses, or to simply throw the client on the mercy of the court.
In light of Strickland, it comes as no surprise that successful
29. See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 608 (1978); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S.
280, 304–05 (1976).
30. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 664 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring
in judgment) (citation omitted).
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ineffectiveness claims were rare, in capital and noncapital cases alike, over
the ensuing decades. As one commentator reports: ―Courts rarely reverse
convictions for ineffective assistance of counsel, even if the defendant‘s
lawyer was asleep, drunk, unprepared, or unknowledgeable. In short, any
‗lawyer with a pulse will be deemed effective.‘‖ 31 It is difficult to imagine an
outcome more at odds with the ideal of effective representation in criminal
cases and, in capital cases, with the additional constitutional imperative of
rational and evenhanded sentencing based on individual desert.
III. TAKING STRICKLAND CLAIMS SERIOUSLY (IN ―DEATH‖ CASES)
Over the last few years, Strickland claims have received a markedly
different reception in the Supreme Court. In 2000, the Court issued the first
of a series of ineffective-assistance decisions that suddenly began to take
Strickland claims—and hence the ideal of effective representation—
seriously. 32 In each case, the defendant was sentenced to death after his
lawyer failed to discover and present readily available evidence that would
have constituted strong grounds for leniency. Each time, the Court found that
the defense attorney had rendered ineffective assistance.
Considering the various meta-rules announced in Strickland, the safe bet
would have been that each death sentence would be upheld. After all, the
defense attorneys made (or arguably made) strategic decisions not to pursue
the lines of inquiry that would have led to helpful mitigation evidence and to
focus on other ways to avoid a death sentence. Without the benefit of
hindsight, it seemed difficult for the ―highly deferential‖ review that
Strickland mandated to result in a finding that the attorneys had rendered
ineffective assistance, and next to impossible in light of the strict standard of
review that governs habeas corpus actions. 33 Nevertheless, in each case, the
31. Stephanos Bibas, The Psychology of Hindsight and After-the-Fact Review of Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 1, 1 (footnote omitted) (quoting Marc L. Miller, Wise
Masters, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1751, 1786 (1999) (book review)). The infamous ―sleeping lawyer‖ case
was Burdine v. Johnson, 231 F.3d 950 (5th Cir. 2000), vacated en banc, 262 F.3d 336 (5th Cir.
2001), in which the defendant challenged his capital conviction on the ground that his lawyer had
slept through entire portions of the trial. Rejecting the notion that prejudice should be presumed in
these circumstances, the panel majority ruled that the defendant could not win without showing that
he suffered Strickland prejudice as a result of something that happened while his attorney dozed. Id.
at 964. The en banc court disagreed and ruled that prejudice should be presumed when a defense
lawyer sleeps through substantial parts of his client‘s capital trial. See Burdine v. Johnson, 262 F.3d
336, 349 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc). The panel decision in Burdine, though extreme, illustrates how
dismissive many courts have been of ineffectiveness claims.
32. See Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003);
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
33. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, federal courts may not grant
habeas relief to a state prisoner unless the the state court outcome was ―contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of
the United States.‖ 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2006). This provision means that federal courts cannot
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Supreme Court ruled in favor of the death row inmate, concluding that he had
received ineffective assistance at the penalty phase. Where it was once
concerned about deferring to strategic choices and not restricting the
autonomy of defense attorneys, the Court now insists that attorneys
representing individuals charged with capital crimes must investigate
mitigation evidence and other potential grounds for avoiding a death sentence
with reasonable diligence and professional competence. Thus, at least in
death penalty cases, Strickland claims are now being taken seriously.
A. Mitigation Evidence: Williams v. Taylor and Wiggins v. Smith
1. (Terry) Williams v. Taylor
The first of the new Strickland cases was (Terry) Williams v. Taylor.34 In
that case, the defense attorney did not even begin to prepare for the penalty
phase until a week beforehand.35 Not surprisingly, the defense failed to
discover a treasure trove of mitigating evidence, including records showing
that the defendant was borderline mentally retarded and had endured what the
majority described as a ―nightmarish childhood‖ of severe physical abuse and
neglect.36 The attorneys also failed to offer evidence from state correctional
officers who offered to testify that the defendant would not be a danger in
prison and failed to return the call of a prominent prison ministry volunteer
who volunteered to testify for the defendant. Having failed to discover any
grounds for leniency, all the attorney could do was plead for mercy based on
his client‘s voluntary confession. 37 The jury sentenced the defendant to death.
By a vote of 6–3, the Supreme Court overturned the sentence. Justice
John Paul Stevens wrote for the majority that ―trial counsel did not fulfill their
obligation to conduct a thorough investigation of the defendant‘s
background.‖38 In support of the notion that defense attorneys must conduct a
background investigation in search of mitigating evidence, the Court cited
only the ABA‘s Standards for Criminal Justice39—the kind of professional

grant habeas relief based merely on a conclusion that the state court committed constitutional error.
In order for relief to be proper, the state court‘s articulation or application of federal law has to be so
wrong, in light of clearly established Supreme Court precedent, as to be deemed ―unreasonable.‖
See, e.g, Williams, 529 U.S. at 412–13.
34. 529 U.S. 362 (2000). There was a separate ruling in 2000 by the Supreme Court in another
Virginia case involving a different petitioner named Williams. All citations and references in this
Essay to Williams v. Taylor concern the case involving Terry Williams.
35. Id. at 395. For the discussion of the facts, see id. at 367–74, 395–96.
36. Id. at 395–96.
37. Even then, the attorney told the jury that his client‘s decision to come forward was ―dumb‖
and proceeded to explore why jurors would find it very difficult to spare his client‘s life. Id. at 369.
38. Id. at 396.
39. Id.
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norms that Strickland had dismissed decades earlier as ―only guides.‖ 40
Although the proper scope of investigation could be considered a matter of
―strategy‖ entitled to substantial deference under Strickland, the Williams
majority ruled that no deference was due to counsel‘s choice. By their own
admission, the reason the attorneys did not seek the records containing the
helpful background information was that they incorrectly believed those
records were nondiscoverable.41 Having failed to make a defensible strategic
choice not to investigate mitigation evidence, the attorneys committed
defective performance in not conducting such an investigation.
The Court further ruled that the failure to investigate prejudiced the client
in his effort to avoid a death sentence. Had counsel conducted a reasonable
investigation into mitigating evidence, they would have discovered a wealth
of evidence about their client‘s tragic background, evidence constituting
strong grounds for leniency.
The dissent, however, had a strong
counterargument based on Strickland. As in Strickland, the mitigation
evidence would likely have made no difference in the outcome given the
―overwhelming‖ nature of the prosecution‘s evidence that the defendant
would be a future danger unless executed. 42 Thus, even if the attorneys
performed defectively by not discovering the helpful evidence, their client
suffered no prejudice and hence could obtain no relief.
The majority held that the strength of the aggravation evidence did not
preclude a finding of prejudice. Although the mitigation evidence ―may not
have overcome a finding of future dangerousness, the graphic description of
Williams‘s childhood, filled with abuse and privation, or the reality that he was
‗borderline mentally retarded,‘ might well have influenced the jury‘s appraisal
of his moral culpability.‖43 In other words, given the wide discretion that
capital juries have to grant leniency, the helpful evidence need not ―undermine
or rebut the prosecution‘s death-eligibility case.‖44 The defendant was
prejudiced if, as was the case, it might have influenced the jury‘s decision that,
as a moral matter, he deserved death. On these grounds, the Court made
history by invalidating a death sentence on Strickland grounds.
2. Wiggins v. Smith
Three years later, the Supreme Court decided Wiggins v. Smith.45 In that
40. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).
41. Williams, 592 U.S. at 395.
42. Id. at 418–19 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Essentially, the
dissent‘s point was that the evidence of future dangerousness was so strong that only a lawless jury
could have chosen a life sentence over death.
43. Id. at 398 (majority opinion).
44. Id.
45. 539 U.S. 510 (2003).
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case, the public defenders representing the defendant had social services
records indicating that their client had suffered an abusive childhood and had
experienced serious emotional difficulties in his youth as he was shuttled
among various foster homes. 46 Based on their own statements at the penalty
phase, the defense knew that these records showed that ―Kevin Wiggins has
had a difficult life‖ and that ―[life] has not been easy for him.‖ 47
Nevertheless, the defense did not follow up on the leads they had.
Although the local practice in their jurisdiction was to request preparation of a
―social history‖ covering the background of defendants facing the death
penalty (which would have been prepared for the defense, free of charge, by a
social worker), the defense did not ask for a social history—a move the state
trial court later characterized as ―absolute error.‖48 Consequently, the defense
went into the sentencing phase ignorant of other records documenting, in even
more graphic detail, the defendant‘s ―excruciating life history‖ of severe
physical and sexual abuse and privation. 49 Counsel also failed to present the
records they did have, or any other evidence, concerning the defendant‘s
―difficult life.‖ Accordingly, the only arguments presented against a death
sentence were that Wiggins was not primarily responsible for the victim‘s
death and that Wiggins had no prior convictions, arguments the jury
rejected.50
Wiggins was a much stronger case for the prosecution than Williams on
the performance issue. In Williams, the defense lawyers mistakenly thought
the documents containing mitigating evidence were not discoverable; they
were thus unaware of the potential mitigating evidence and could do little
more than throw their client on the mercy of the court. In Wiggins, by
contrast, the defense did search for mitigation evidence and had learned, at
least in broad outlines, of a potential mitigation defense based on the
defendant‘s background. The failure to discover and present the detailed
mitigation evidence found on postconviction review seemingly reflected a

46. Id. at 523, 525.
47. Id. at 515 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
48. Id. at 517, 524 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
49. Id. at 537. The abuse included multiple episodes of sexual molestation and outright rape
while in various foster care facilities. Id. at 517. It also included regular abandonment as a child,
with no source of food for days on end other than ―beg[ging] for food‖ and ―eat[ing] paint chips and
garbage.‖ Id. at 516–17. See generally id. at 516–18 (discussing results of social history prepared on
postconviction review).
50. Id. at 515, 537. To be fair, the defendant‘s lawyers had vigorously sought to have the
penalty phase bifurcated so that they could lead with their preferred defenses and, in the event those
defenses failed, fall back on a mitigation defense. According to defense counsel, when the trial court
denied the bifurcation motion, they decided to drop the mitigation defense rather than take the risk
that it might detract from their arguments about the client‘s secondary role in the murder and lack of
prior criminal record. Id. at 515.
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choice by counsel to focus on lines of defense they regarded as more
promising than a mitigation defense. The choice among potential lines of
defense, not to mention how far to search for helpful evidence, would appear
to be exactly what Strickland had in mind by ―strategic‖ decisions that
receive, at most, only highly deferential review.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court again ruled for the prisoner—this time,
by an even wider (7–2) margin. As in Williams, the Court cited ABA
standards requiring defense attorneys to search for mitigation evidence in
capital cases; this time, however, the Court also looked to local practice as
informing the ineffectiveness inquiry. It was ―standard practice‖ in Maryland
capital cases to have a thorough social history prepared gathering and
synthesizing potential mitigation evidence based on the background and life
history of the defendant.51 The Court saw no valid reason for counsel to have
departed from that practice in Wiggins‘s case: counsel already had reason to
suspect that promising mitigation evidence would be found in the client‘s
background, and the report would have been prepared, at no cost, for the
defense.
The majority refused to defer to counsel‘s choice as a strategic decision
not to expand their investigation into the defendant‘s background or request a
social history. Far from supplying an accurate explanation of counsel‘s
actions, the claim of tactics was merely a ―post hoc rationalization,‖ an effort,
in effect, to provide cover for their serious errors of judgment. 52 As the Court
viewed the case, counsel‘s failure to discover and present mitigation evidence
―resulted from inattention,‖ the very antithesis of the professional judgment
and skill that attorneys are obligated to bring to bear on behalf of their
clients.53
Significantly, the defense‘s decision could not be upheld even if viewed as
a strategic decision. Citing Strickland, the Court ruled that the deference due
to strategic decisions critically depends on the degree of investigation on
which those decisions are based: ―‗strategic choices made after less than
complete investigation are reasonable‘ only to the extent that ‗reasonable
professional judgments support the limitations on investigation.‘ A decision
not to investigate thus ‗must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the
circumstances.‘‖54
51. Id. at 524.
52. Id. at 526–27. The majority noted, for example, that although counsel claimed to have
made the tactical decision not to present a mitigation defense, their own opening statement at the
penalty phase belied that claim. Id. at 526. The defense signaled that they were going to put on a
mitigation defense, telling the jury that ―‗Kevin Wiggins has had a difficult life‘‖ and that ―‗[life] has
not been easy for him.‘‖ Id. at 515 (citation omitted).
53. Id. at 526.
54. Id. at 533 (citation omitted) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690–91
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Here, as Maryland‘s local practice suggested, it was unreasonable to
short-circuit the search for mitigation evidence and to forgo the social history,
particularly given that counsel already knew, as they would tell the jury at
sentencing, that their client had had a ―difficult life.‖ With such promising
early returns on the mitigation issue, any reasonably competent lawyer would
have delved deeper to get a better idea of what mitigation evidence was
available. 55 Absent reasonable investigation into the potential mitigation
evidence, the majority concluded, ―counsel were not in a position to make a
reasonable strategic choice‖ to write off a mitigation defense. 56
The issue of Strickland prejudice was more straightforward. Although
counsel insisted that they made a conscious decision to forgo a mitigation
defense, the majority believed it reasonably probable that, once they had seen
how powerful the background evidence was, even they would have introduced
it.57 Had they done so, the jury might have been moved by the defendant‘s
―excruciating life history‖ to show leniency. Importantly, even if some jurors
(or a majority of jurors) might nonetheless have voted for a death sentence,
prejudice still existed. Given the requirement under Maryland law that the
death penalty cannot be imposed without juror unanimity, it was enough that
―at least one juror‖ might have opted for leniency if apprised of the mitigation
evidence. 58
B. Aggravation Evidence: Rompilla v. Beard
In the last of the trilogy of new Strickland cases, Rompilla v. Beard,59 the
Supreme Court considered the duty of defense attorneys to investigate
possible grounds for disproving or minimizing the aggravating factors
identified by prosecutors. The prosecution sought to prove an aggravating
factor with testimony from someone whom the defendant had attacked
decades earlier under allegedly similar circumstances.60 Nevertheless, the

(1984)).
55. Id. at 534.
56. Id. at 536. The majority was careful to disclaim any suggestion that defense attorneys must
always present mitigation evidence in capital cases, leaving open the possibility that attorneys might
reasonably elect, after due investigation, to bypass potential mitigation defenses in favor of other
defenses. See id. at 533.
57. With the voluminous, and quite graphic, evidence of severe childhood abuse and mental
deficiencies that was later discovered, a reasonable attorney would have concluded that a mitigation
defense was not only strong but arguably stronger than the other defenses counsel presented.
Coupled with the fact that mitigation evidence was not inconsistent with the other defenses, a
reasonable attorney likely would have opted to present a mitigation defense alongside the other
defenses. Id. at 535.
58. Id. at 537.
59. 545 U.S. 374 (2005).
60. Id. at 383–84.
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public defenders who represented the defendant did not even investigate the
prior crime (which was a matter of public record open to public inspection in
the courthouse‘s files), much less challenge the prosecution‘s account of the
prior crime. 61 The jury seemed to be looking for grounds on which to show
mercy—it even cited, as a mitigating factor, the fact that the defendant had a
young son who testified that he loved his father and would visit him in prison
if his father‘s life was spared62—but was given nothing to counter the
prosecution‘s aggravation evidence and no mitigation evidence of the kind
presented in Williams and Wiggins. The sentence was death.
Again, the Supreme Court reversed. Though clearly troubled by the
various shortcuts the defense team took in the search for mitigation
evidence—which led them to miss helpful background evidence that
presented strong grounds for mercy—the Court did not rest its decision on the
shortcomings of the mitigation case. The attorneys‘ ineffectiveness lay in
their failure to investigate the circumstances of the prior crime cited by the
prosecutor as an aggravating factor.63
Disregarding Strickland‘s mandate that attorney autonomy should not be
restricted by hard-and-fast rules about how to represent their clients, the
majority announced a sweeping duty to investigate in capital cases. ―It is the
duty of the lawyer,‖ the Court ruled, ―to conduct a prompt investigation of the
circumstances of the case and to explore all avenues leading to facts relevant
to the merits of the case and the penalty in the event of conviction.‖ 64 The
Court grounded that unyielding duty squarely on several provisions of the
ABA‘s Standards for Criminal Justice, essentially treating those ―guides‖
under Strickland, in the dissent‘s words, ―as if they were binding statutory
text.‖65
The majority, however, was unmoved by the criticism. In its view, it
―flouts prudence to deny that a defense lawyer should try to look at a file he
knows the prosecution will cull for aggravating evidence.‖ 66 This is because
defense attorneys who fail to investigate the aggravating factors on which the
prosecution intends to rely at the penalty phase ―seriously compromis[e] their
opportunity to respond to a case for aggravation‖ and allow prosecutors who
are so inclined to misstate the evidence or conceal helpful evidence from the
jury.67 That is why, for example, the Standards for Criminal Justice
61. Id. at 384–85.
62. Id. at 378.
63. Id. at 383.
64. Id. at 387 (quoting STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE §§ 4–4.1 (2d ed. 1982 Supp.)
[hereinafter STANDARDS]) (internal quotation marks omitted).
65. Id. at 400 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 389 (majority opinion).
67. Id. at 385–86.

2009]

TAKING STRICKLAND CLAIMS SERIOUSLY

533

admonish defense attorneys that their investigation ―should include efforts to
secure information in the possession of the prosecution and law enforcement
authorities.‖68
The duty to investigate is not necessarily as sweeping as the language
from Rompilla might suggest. The operative test, as the Court made clear,
remains what a ―reasonable lawyer‖ would do in a particular case. 69 A lawyer
could reasonably decide not to pursue a line of investigation that amounts to a
fishing expedition or would be so boundless and resource-intensive as to be
impracticable. Consequently, the Rompilla majority cautioned that a defense
lawyer is not required to ―look[] for a needle in a haystack, when a lawyer
truly has reason to doubt there is any needle there,‖ 70 or to examine
―warehouses of records‖ in the search for helpful evidence. 71 In such
circumstances, reasonable attorneys will necessarily limit the scope of their
investigation.
Nevertheless, evidence that defense attorneys know the prosecution will
use in aggravation at the penalty phase is in a very different category. As the
Court declared, ―defense counsel must obtain information that the State has
and will use against the defendant [in aggravation].‖72 This duty is so
important to the accuracy of the adjudicative process in general, and of the
capital sentencing process in particular, that the majority was unable to ―think
of any situation in which defense counsel should not make some effort to
learn the information in the possession of the prosecution and law
enforcement authorities.‖73 Therefore, in order to render effective assistance
at the penalty phase of a capital case, defense counsel must make reasonable
efforts to investigate the aggravating factors cited by the prosecution and,
more generally, to find out everything that the government knows about the
68. Id. at 387 (quoting STANDARDS, supra note 64, at §§ 4–4.1) (internal quotation marks
omitted and emphasis added).
69. Id. at 389; see also id. at 381 (stating that attorney performance is measured against a
―standard of reasonableness applied as if one stood in counsel‘s shoes‖).
70. Id. at 389.
71. Id. at 386 n.4, 389; see also id. at 382–83 (cautioning that ―the duty to investigate does not
force defense lawyers to scour the globe on the off chance something will turn up‖).
72. Id. at 387 (emphasis added).
73. Id. at 387 n.6. That was most certainly true in Rompilla, as the concurrence argued:
[T]he prosecutor clearly planned to use details of the prior crime as powerful
evidence that Rompilla was a dangerous man for whom the death penalty would
be both appropriate punishment and a necessary means of incapacitation. This
was evidence the defense should have been prepared to meet: A reasonable
defense lawyer would have attached a high importance to obtaining the record
of the prior trial, in order to anticipate and find ways of deflecting the
prosecutor‘s aggravation argument.
Id. at 394 (O‘Connor, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
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case.
Even more interesting than what Rompilla had to say about the duty to
investigate is the context in which the Court said it. One might infer from the
finding of defective performance in Rompilla that the defense team had
missed available grounds for undermining the prosecutor‘s claim that the prior
crime was an aggravating factor. That inference, however, would be
incorrect. Although the defective performance in Rompilla was the failure to
investigate the aggravating factors, the prejudice concerned missed mitigation
evidence. Had the defense searched the court file on the prior crime for
grounds to counteract the prosecutor‘s aggravation evidence, the majority
ruled, they ―would have found a range of mitigation leads that no other source
had opened up,‖ revealing a history of severe mental illness, child abuse, and
alcoholism74—a theory of prejudice, as the dissent tendentiously put it, based
on ―serendipity‖ in that by investigating the aggravation evidence the defense
would have ―stumbled across‖ previously undiscovered mitigation evidence. 75
Rompilla is significant because it forces defense attorneys to approach
capital sentencing hearings in the same holistic fashion that prosecutors do.
Instead of focusing their investigative efforts just on ―their‖ part of the case
(namely, the mitigation case), defense attorneys must investigate the entire
case. By pushing defense attorneys to try to learn as much as they can about
the case as a whole (and, ideally, everything that the government knows about
the case), the constitutional duty to render effective assistance will help ensure
that both sides of the life/death balance jurors must strike in capital cases will
receive meaningful adversarial testing, instead of just the mitigation side of
the balance. To the extent that happens, the life/death decision will be better
informed and more likely to reflect true individual desert, as Eighth
Amendment precedent demands, and less likely to be skewed by arbitrary
factors such as attorney performance and resource disparities between
prosecution and defense.
C. Strickland and the “Politics of Death”
It is hardly coincidental that capital cases gave rise to the Supreme Court‘s
new, more solicitous approach to Strickland claims. Cases such as Williams
v. Taylor, Wiggins v. Smith, and Rompilla v. Beard are best understood as an
effort to reshape ineffective-assistance doctrine in light of the deleterious
effects of the ―politics of death‖ on the administration of the death penalty. 76
74. Id. at 390 (majority opinion).
75. Id. at 405 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
76. The following passage captures the essence of the politics of death:
With the death penalty established as a highly salient political issue, politicians
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By virtue of the politics of death, indigent capital defense is notoriously
underfunded, both in absolute terms and in comparison to prosecutors,
particularly in states that lead the nation in executions, such as Texas and
Virginia.77 The underfunding of indigent capital defense, in turn, makes it
exceptionally difficult for the lawyers who represent indigent capital
defendants to conduct the exhaustive investigation necessary to discover
helpful evidence at sentencing—which, as Williams and its progeny show, can
mislead juries into imposing death on defendants who had strong grounds for
leniency that the jurors never got to hear or see developed in a professionally
competent manner.78 A rational, fairly applied death penalty cannot be
attained as long as resource constraints cripple public defenders and appointed
counsel in the effort to discover and develop evidence to counteract the
aggravation evidence that prosecutors, with their significantly greater levels of
funding,79 vigorously present in capital cases.
have strong institutional incentives to make death sentences easier to achieve.
Legislatures expand the scope of the death penalty and restrict access to the
courts for prisoners on death row. Most importantly, legislatures tie the hands
of indigent defenders by denying them the funding and resources that they need,
and that prosecutors receive, to be effective in resource-intensive capital trials.
Prosecutors have incentives to use the death penalty as leverage to get
defendants to plead guilty and, in cases where death will not be traded for guilty
pleas, to win and carry out death sentences. As resource-constrained capital
defenders get steamrolled by prosecutors determined to win even at great cost,
juries are given inadequate reasons for showing leniency (even when
compelling reasons exist) and thus often respond with verdicts of death. Try as
they might, state judges are, in the final analysis, unable to counteract the push
toward death, and state governors will usually have strong incentives, except in
clear cases of actual innocence or major failures of the judicial process, to punt
the life/death decision to the courts.
Smith, supra note 6, at 285–86.
77. See generally id. at 302–07 (explaining that legislatures better fund prosecutors than
indigent defenders because doing so facilitates punishing crime, an outcome voters desire).
78. Justice O‘Connor, who not only authored Strickland but was in the majority in Williams,
Wiggins, and Rompilla, has openly worried that the death penalty is skewed by the poor
representation that indigent defendants receive. See Maria Elena Baca, O’Connor Critical of Death
Penalty: The First Female Supreme Court Justice Spoke in Minneapolis to a Lawyers’ Group ,
STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis, Minn.), July 3, 2001, at A1. In a 2001 speech to a Minnesota women‘s bar
group, Justice O‘Connor expressed serious doubts ―about whether the death penalty is being fairly
administered in this country.‖ Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). As proof, she cited grisly
statistics from Texas indicating that ―those who were represented by appointed defense attorneys
were 28 percent more likely to be convicted than were those who had retained their own attorneys; if
convicted, they also were 44 percent more likely to be sentenced to death.‖ Id. Based on this
phenomenon, Justice O‘Connor suggested that ―it‘s time to look at minimum standards for appointed
counsel in death cases and adequate compensation for appointed counsel when they are used.‖ Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted).
79. See generally Douglas W. Vick, Poorhouse Justice: Underfunded Indigent Defense
Services and Arbitrary Death Sentences, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 329, 394–95 (1995) (citing figures
showing that ―[p]rosecutors receive on average more than three times the funding that is provided to
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Seen in this light, the Supreme Court‘s renewed interest in the right to
effective assistance of counsel in capital cases makes perfect sense. The
undemanding standard of effectiveness adopted in Strickland contributed to a
death penalty that is applied haphazardly by giving the political branches carte
blanche to use resource constraints to stack the deck against indigent
defendants in capital sentencing hearings. This result is ironic indeed: while
the Court‘s Eighth Amendment cases insist that death penalty schemes be
structured in ways that promote rationality and fairness in the application of
the ultimate sanction,80 the Court‘s Sixth Amendment cases, from Strickland
until Williams, tolerated—and, in light of death‘s politics, essentially
guaranteed—that the goals of the Eighth Amendment cases would remain
largely unfulfilled. With Williams and its progeny, the Court has finally
harmonized the two divergent strands of cases, making it more likely that
capital sentencers will receive the information they need to make reasoned
appraisals of whether particular defendants deserve death or leniency.

defenders in the United States‖ and explaining that ―the differential is really much greater than that
figure indicates‖).
80. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972) (invalidating death penalty
schemes that allow arbitrary imposition of death sentences as violative of the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause).
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IV. ―DEATH‖ MAY NOT BE ALL THAT ―DIFFERENT‖ AFTER ALL:
TAKING STRICKLAND CLAIMS SERIOUSLY (IN ALL CASES)
As previously explained, the new Strickland cases have a lot to say about
the death penalty. It is tempting to conclude that they speak only to capital
cases and, consequently, have nothing at all to say about how ineffectiveness
challenges should be treated in other cases. There is much to be said for this
view—after all, the Supreme Court often treats the death penalty as
―different‖ and hence subject to more stringent safeguards, 81 and attorney
error is widely believed to be an especially serious problem in complex,
resource- and labor-intensive capital cases.82 These facts, coupled with the
Court‘s failure, to date, to apply heightened standards of effectiveness in
noncapital cases, add up to strong grounds for concluding that the Court has
essentially adopted a heightened standard for attorney performance that is
reserved for capital cases only.
Nevertheless, closer inspection reveals that there is a decent case to be
made that the recent ineffectiveness cases should apply to all criminal
prosecutions. To restrict the new Strickland decisions to capital cases is to
ignore several key changes they worked in ineffectiveness doctrine. These
changes take aim at the Strickland meta-rules that led courts not to take
ineffectiveness claims seriously in the first place. Just as these changes in
ineffectiveness doctrine resulted in more vigorous review of attorney error in
capital cases, so too should these changes lead courts to take Strickland claims
more seriously in cases involving lesser sanctions.
A. Distinguishing Strategy from “Strategery”83
Strickland was read for many years as creating a ―magic words‖
jurisprudence of sorts. Whenever an attorney committed an error, all that
seemed necessary was for the attorney to say ―strategy‖ and, lo and behold,
even the most egregious and prejudicial errors could be made to vanish.
Indeed, when attorneys failed to utter the magic word, courts were all too
eager to supply the necessary incantation for them, upholding as strategic

81. See, e.g., Steiker & Steiker, supra note 25, at 397–401. For a recent critique of the deathis-different approach, see Rachel E. Barkow, The Court of Life and Death: The Two Tracks of
Constitutional Sentencing Law and the Case for Uniformity, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1145 (2009).
82. See generally Smith, supra note 6, at 302–07.
83. See generally Wikipedia.org, Strategery, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strategery (last
visited Jan. 7, 2010). The word ―strategery‖ was first used in a Saturday Night Live sketch aired
October 7, 2000, satirizing the performances of Al Gore and George W. Bush, two candidates for
President of the United States, during the first presidential debate for election year 2000. Comedian
Will Ferrell played Bush and used the word ―strategery‖ (a play on ―strategy‖) to satirize Bush‘s
tendency to mispronounce words. Id. I use the term ―strategery‖ here to refer to litigation tactics
that purport to be strategy, but are anything but strategic.
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choices decisions that even the attorney involved may have attributed to
another ground.84 To do otherwise was seen as inconsistent with meta-rules in
Strickland suggesting that it is improper and beyond the judicial ken for courts
to second-guess attorneys on matters that might reflect strategy calls.
A key component of the new approach to ineffective-assistance claims
after Williams v. Taylor is recognition of the overriding need to distinguish
between ―strategery‖—attorney blunders masquerading as ―strategy‖—from
tactical decisions that are exercises in sound professional judgment and thus
deserving of judicial deference. Where Strickland, as originally understood,
made it all too easy for defense attorneys to defend errors of judgment as
tactical moves that, as (bad) luck would have it, ended in disaster for the
client, courts are now instructed to view self-serving invocations of ―strategy‖
by counsel with a jaundiced eye. Far from requiring reflexive deference to
claimed exercises of strategic judgment, the judicial role actually demands
that judges carefully probe claims of ―strategy‖ for accuracy (as an account of
counsel‘s actual thought process at the time of the challenged decision) and
reasonableness in light of the circumstances of the case. By smoking out
pretextual claims of ―strategy‖ and sorting tactical decisions that are the
product of reasonable professional judgment from those that are not, the
objective is to ensure that judicial outcomes are not skewed by serious
attorney error.
Wiggins v. Smith illustrates both aspects of the current heightened scrutiny
for claims of ―strategy.‖ After delivering an opening statement telling jurors
that the defense would use their client‘s ―difficult life‖ as mitigation evidence
warranting leniency, the lawyers failed to present any mitigation evidence.
That did not stop them from claiming that they had made a strategic decision
to rely on grounds for defense other than mitigation evidence at the penalty
phase. The Court rejected the strategy claim as merely a ―post hoc
rationalization,‖ citing the defense‘s opening statement as proof that they had
not, in fact, opted against a mitigation defense. 85 Moreover, even though it
might be reasonable to give up a mitigation defense in some cases (perhaps
84. For example, in Strickland, the attorney admitted that it was a bout of ―hopelessness‖ about
the client‘s fate that caused him to cut short his efforts on the client‘s behalf, a fact the dissent
understandably stressed. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 718 (1984) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). The majority, however, refused to accept
the attorney‘s admission and said that ―counsel made a strategic choice to argue for the extreme
emotional distress mitigating circumstance and to rely as fully as possible on [the client‘s]
acceptance of responsibility . . . .‖ Id. at 699 (majority opinion).
85. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 526–27 (2003); see also id. at 526 (stating that counsel‘s
―failure to investigate thoroughly resulted from inattention, not . . . strategic judgment‖). In Wiggins,
the Court refused to credit the attorney‘s testimony that the defense team already knew the matters
they were accused of not having fully investigated, testimony that struck the Court as contrary to the
record as a whole. Id. at 530–32.
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even in Wiggins‘s case), the price of judicial deference to strategic choices is
reasonable investigation of the pertinent considerations. As the Wiggins
majority put it, until they have conducted a reasonable investigation into the
relevant facts and circumstances (such as the relative strength of the grounds
for defense being surrendered and those being pursued), ―counsel [are] not in
a position to make a reasonable strategic choice.‖ 86
There is no reason to think that the Court‘s recent emphasis on the
reviewability of strategic decisions by defense attorneys is limited to capital
cases. Capital cases are hardly unique in requiring defense attorneys to make
strategic decisions. In all but the simplest of cases, criminal defense attorneys
are required to make a variety of strategic choices that can significantly affect
the outcome of the case. 87 Indeed, this is precisely why Strickland rejected a
―checklist‖ or ―guideline‖ approach to legal representation in the first place:
such an approach would fail to accommodate the need for attorneys, in all
kinds of criminal cases, to make strategic decisions about how best to advance
their clients‘ interests in particular contexts. The need for attorneys to make
strategy decisions, in noncapital and capital cases alike, implies a
corresponding need for courts to scrutinize those decisions to ensure that they
comported with professional standards of competence. Failing such scrutiny,
serious attorney error will potentially undermine the reliability and accuracy
of criminal proceedings.
B. Holding Defense Attorneys to Professional Standards of Practice
Strickland was long understood to mean that professional standards of
representation are ―only guides‖ and thus not controlling for constitutional
purposes.88 The obvious—and quite damaging—implication was that attorney
conduct that falls below professional standards of representation might
nonetheless be deemed to be ―effective‖ in the constitutional sense. Without a
baseline against which to measure the reasonableness of attorney conduct
challenged as ineffective, it is little wonder that courts so readily deferred to
the judgment of defense attorneys about how to handle their cases in the first
two decades under Strickland.
86. Id. at 536; see also id. at 522–23 (―[O]ur principal concern . . . is not whether counsel
should have presented a mitigation case. Rather, we focus on whether the investigation supporting
counsel‘s decision not to introduce mitigating evidence of Wiggins‘ background was itself
reasonable.‖).
87. These include (1) the scope of discovery and pretrial investigation to conduct, (2) the terms
to seek from the prosecutor during plea negotiations, (3) whether or not to advise the client to enter
into a plea agreement, (4) the defenses and arguments that should and should not be raised (both at
trial and sentencing), (5) whether to make objections and on what grounds, (6) the witnesses to call
(and not to call) to testify, (7) whether (and how extensively) to cross-examine adverse witnesses,
and (8) the evidence to offer (or not to offer) during the defense case.
88. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.
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The recent ineffectiveness cases, beginning with Williams v. Taylor, refute
the idea that the standards of representation generated by the legal profession
carry little, if any, weight in determining what constitutes constitutionally
effective representation. In each case, the Court relied heavily on professional
standards in determining that the attorneys had rendered their clients
ineffective assistance. 89 With objective standards to ground the inquiry into
the performance prong of Strickland, it makes sense that courts will find cases
where attorneys crossed the line separating ―effective‖ from ―ineffective‖
representation.
The fact that the performance inquiry is now informed, to a large extent,
by professional standards of representation has broad implications for how
Strickland claims are to be received in noncapital cases. Professional
standards, after all, do not simply speak to capital cases; they also provide
important guidance as to how defense attorneys should represent clients in
other criminal cases. A prime example is the American Bar Association‘s
influential Standards for Criminal Justice (ABA Standards), which address
both the prosecution and defense functions. 90
Promulgated after ―extensive review by representatives of all segments of
the criminal justice system,‖ including judges, prosecutors, private defense
counsel, and public defenders, the ABA Standards reflect ―a consensus view
of all segments of the criminal justice community about what good,
professional practice is and should be.‖ 91 The standards for the defense
function contain dozens of separate professional norms, organized in eight
different parts, addressing in detail how defense attorneys should handle
criminal cases. As its drafters hoped, the ABA Standards provide ―extremely
useful standards for consultation by lawyers and judges who want to do the
‗right thing‘ or, as important, to avoid doing ‗the wrong thing.‘‖ 92
There are, to be sure, special guidelines for capital cases, such as the
ABA‘s Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel
in Death Penalty Cases (ABA Guidelines). 93 As previously noted, some of
89. In Rompilla, for example, the Court repeatedly cited and quoted from the American Bar
Association‘s Standards for Criminal Justice in its discussion of the contours of the constitutional
duty to investigate. See generally Blume & Neumann, supra note 6, at 152 (noting that ―Wiggins
referenced ABA standards six times as the benchmark of appropriate attorney conduct‖ and
―Rompilla cited to ABA standards on eight occasions as evidence that trial counsel‘s efforts were
below the constitutional floor‖). Wiggins likewise relied heavily on professional standards, but also
relied on contemporary local practice in the jurisdiction where the trial occurred. See Wiggins, 539
U.S. at 524.
90. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION,
at xii (3d ed. 1993).
91. Id. at xii, xiv.
92. Id. at xiv.
93. GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL IN DEATH
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the recent ineffective-assistance cases have relied on these guidelines, as
distinct from the generally applicable ABA Standards. Nevertheless, it is
significant that these cases also relied heavily on the ABA Standards, which
apply to all criminal cases.94 By repeatedly relying on the ABA Standards,
the recent Strickland cases make clear that general norms of professional
criminal representation must be applied in evaluating attorney performance.
In doing so, they also indicate that the new, invigorated approach to
Strickland claims is not limited to capital cases. If, as Wiggins and Rompilla
show, noncapital professional norms (such as the ABA Standards) must be
consulted in evaluating the performance of counsel in capital cases, it stands
to reason that such norms must also be consulted in noncapital cases as well. 95
In both contexts, the Court—true to the original Strickland mandate that ―the
proper measure of attorney performance‖ is ―reasonableness under prevailing
professional norms‖96—has made it clear that the effectiveness of defense
counsel is no longer to be decided in a vacuum, without reference to the
professional standards of representation that exist to guide attorneys in the
performance of the criminal defense function. Finally, after twenty-five
years, Strickland has teeth, and courts are taking Strickland claims seriously
in all cases: when defense attorneys prejudice their clients‘ cause by acting
unreasonably in light of professional norms, courts will not hesitate to find a
violation of the right to the effective representation of counsel. 97
This development is long overdue. The constitutional idea of effective
representation exists so that criminal trials will generate accurate, reliable
outcomes. As the Court recognized in Strickland, the lawyer‘s role in
criminal proceedings (including capital sentencing hearings) is ―to ensure that
PENALTY CASES (rev. ed. 2003), available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/
indigentdefense/deathpenaltyguidelines2003.pdf.
94. See supra note 89.
95. It is possible, of course, that in cases like Wiggins and Rompilla the Court merely seized
upon the ABA Standards as support for reversing the death sentences before it without intending that
those standards would apply in cases not involving the death penalty. This account is not only
speculative, but unconvincing as well. In neither case were the ABA Standards the only basis on
which to find that the lawyers had rendered ineffective assistance: in Wiggins, the defense team had
violated clear local practice to always request a social history for a client facing a death sentence, and
in Wiggins and Rompilla the inadequate investigation into mitigation evidence violated clear
mandates from the ABA Guidelines. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524 (2003); Rompilla v.
Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 387 (2005). It simply was not the case that the Court was struggling to find a
basis on which to reverse. Seen in this light, the opinions in both cases should be taken at face value:
the Court cited and applied the ABA Standards as part of its inquiry into defective performance
because it views those standards as properly informing what constitutes ineffective assistance under
Strickland.
96. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (emphasis added).
97. See Blume & Neumann, supra note 6, at 156 (reviewing data indicating a ―marked
increase‖ in the number of successful ineffectiveness claims, in capital and noncapital cases alike,
after Williams and its progeny).
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the adversarial testing process works to produce a just result under the
standards governing decision.‖98 Accuracy and reliability are obviously
important concerns when the death penalty is at stake; just as obviously,
however, those concerns are also important in criminal cases involving lesser
punishments. Criminal proceedings will not generate accurate, reliable
results, or, ultimately, engender public confidence, if, as the Supreme Court
once put it, defendants are ―left to the mercies of incompetent counsel.‖ 99
That, however, is precisely what the original Strickland standards did by
making it exceedingly difficult for defendants to obtain new trials based on
even the most egregious attorney errors. Now that, as a result of decisions
like Williams v. Taylor, courts are taking Strickland claims seriously,
ineffectiveness doctrine is, at long last, promoting, rather than undermining,
the constitutional idea of effective representation.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has come a long way since it decided Strickland v.
Washington back in 1984. In that case, the Court paid homage to the
constitutional ideal of effective representation and adopted a basic
performance-and-prejudice standard that appeared to guard against the danger
that the outcome of criminal trials would be skewed by serious defense
attorney error. The appearance, however, was deceiving. It soon became
clear that Strickland could never meaningfully promote the goal of effective
representation because of various meta-rules announced in the case to guide
the evaluation of ineffectiveness claims. These meta-rules mandated extreme
deference to the choices of counsel that might reflect ―strategy‖ or ―tactics‖
and essentially blindfolded courts by requiring them to evaluate the
performance of counsel without any authoritative judicial or professional
standards of performance to apply. The Strickland standards (plural)—that is,
the performance-and-prejudice standard and the various meta-rules governing
the application of the performance and prejudice prongs—collectively ensured
that ineffectiveness doctrine (and, with it, the constitutional ideal of effective
representation) would be a dead letter. The ensuing two decades, which saw
courts reject ineffectiveness challenges to a wide array of stunningly
incompetent and unprofessional representation, made this reality painfully
clear.
Fortunately, the Supreme Court has reversed course. In a trilogy of cases
that began with Williams v. Taylor, the Court rejected the meta-rules that had
rendered Strickland a paper tiger. The blindfold has been lifted, and now
courts look closely at professional standards of representation in evaluating
98. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
99. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970).
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the effectiveness of attorney performance. Moreover, courts no longer
respond to the ―magic words‖ of ―strategy‖ and ―tactics‖: all attorney
decisions, whether strategic or tactical in nature, are being reviewed with a
jaundiced eye for reasonableness in light of prevailing professional norms.
Thus, Strickland claims are now being taken seriously.
The result of the recently reinvigorated Strickland standards is striking.
There has been a considerable increase in the number of successful
ineffectiveness claims—in both federal and state court, and in capital and
noncapital cases—since Williams was decided in 2000.100 Each year, dozens
of defendants who, in previous decades, would have been packed off to prison
or the death chamber despite serious attorney errors in their cases, are thus
now receiving new trials all over the country—opportunities, in other words,
to obtain more favorable results, either at trial or sentencing, or on appeal,
with the constitutionally effective representation the Constitution guarantees
every criminal defendant.
The significance of the invigorated Strickland standards can be seen in the
subsequent history in Williams v. Taylor. After the Supreme Court remanded
for a new sentencing hearing, the prosecutor, faced for the first time with the
prospect of a mitigation defense (which was conspicuously absent in the first
trial due to the ineffectiveness of the defense team), dropped the execution
demand and agreed to a life sentence. 101 One can hardly imagine a more vivid
illustration of the value of effective assistance of counsel. The offender and
the crime were precisely the same at Williams‘s trial and on remand. The
only difference was the quality of the lawyers who represented Williams: his
court-appointed attorneys earned him a death sentence by failing to look for
evidence that might convince jurors that their client deserved mercy despite
his terrible crime, whereas the lawyers who represented him on
postconviction review did the diligent investigation that professional
standards require and thus were able to assemble a mitigation case strong
enough to convince the prosecutor to accept a life sentence instead of death.
Seen in this light, Williams was really sentenced to die, not for the murder he
committed, but rather for the ineptitude of his original attorneys, a factor that
ought to play no part in who lives and who dies—or, for that matter, in the
outcome of any criminal case.
100. See Blume & Neumann, supra note 6, at 156.
101. See Frank Green, Death Row Veteran’s Life Spared, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH (Va.),
Nov. 15, 2000, at A1 (reporting the terms of the agreement reached with Williams on remand from
Williams v. Taylor). The prosecutor was not alone in his reaction to the newly discovered mitigation
evidence: the state trial judge who presided over Williams‘s sentencing recommended that the state
supreme court vacate the death sentence he himself had imposed after hearing, on postconviction
review, the mitigation evidence that had not been presented at the sentencing phase. See Williams v.
Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 370–71 (2000).
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Of course, in a world of resource constraints and wealth differentials
among defendants, it is inevitable that attorney performance will, to some
degree, impact the outcome of criminal cases. This fact of life does not mean,
however, that constitutional criminal procedure should be indifferent to the
adverse effects that resource constraints can have on the fairness and
reliability of criminal proceedings. Perhaps criminal procedure can help
eliminate, or at least reduce, those effects.
The recent ineffectiveness cases suggest that the Supreme Court is looking
to current ineffectiveness doctrine to be part of the solution instead of part of
the problem. If, as is commonly supposed, ineffective representation is
largely a function of the severe resource constraints the political process
imposes on lawyers for indigent defendants, a toothless constitutional
standard of effective representation—the kind of standard Strickland
represented in its first two decades—virtually invites legislatures to continue
underfunding indigent defense.
By contrast, a more demanding
ineffectiveness standard can help counteract the legislative strategy of using
resource constraints. As long as courts stand ready and willing to set aside
convictions and sentences where attorney error factored into the outcome,
underfunding will no longer remain a cost-free strategy. Underfunding may
make it easier for prosecutors to win convictions and death sentences, but
those fruits of their labors will be less impervious to attack on ineffectiveness
grounds. This, in turn, may give legislatures a much-needed incentive to
reduce the crushing caseloads and other severe resource constraints that make
ineffective representation so commonplace. If that happens, then criminal
trials will be more likely to result in the meaningful adversarial testing our
system relies on to produce fair and accurate results, and prosecutors who win
will do so on the right grounds—namely, the strength and justice of their
cause—rather than the ineptitude of the defense lawyer.

